Operation Sindoor Heralds A New Era Of Indian Deterrence Against Pakistan

Did India Accomplish Its Objectives Through ‘Operation Sindoor’?

Per a press release from India’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB), Operation Sindoor was “conceived to punish perpetrators and planners of terror” and was “aimed to destroy terror infrastructure across the border”

The aforesaid objectives have definitely been accomplished, however, experts have also framed Operation Sindoor as being a punitive measure of the Indian government intended at deterring Pakistan from waging its unconventional war – through sponsorship of terrorism – against India by inflicting significant damage to Pakistan through conventional means of hard power.

And, this is where the Author is a bit skeptical. This is because, the Pakistani establishment, in which the country’s military apparatus plays a dominant role, is an ideologically motivated and a determined adversary which heavily relies on use of force to realise its political goals, both at domestic and international levels.

For instance, Pakistan’s internal economic woes as well as political instability, together with the recent upsurge in homegrown insurgent activity which the Pakistani armed forces have failed to contain, have put a dent in the image of the overall Pakistani establishment.³

In such times of crisis, tensions with India help Pakistan’s military apparatus to rally the country’s citizenry in its support. Per a Gallup Pakistan survey cited by Al Jazeera, 92 percent of more than 500 respondents in this survey, conducted between May 11^th and 15^th, said that their opinion of the Pakistani military improved as a result of the recent stand-off with India.

Moreover, 96 percent of respondents believed that Pakistan emerged as a victor in this stand-off, with 82 percent rating the Pakistani armed forces’ performance as “very good” and less than 1 percent voicing disapproval.

Now, with that kind of an aftermath of a stand-off with India, it is hard to imagine for the Author that the Pakistani military establishment is deterred in any measure by any of India’s military actions inside Pakistan despite the stunning success of these military actions.

Of course, the disproportionate relative capability advantage that India has demonstrated in its recent stand-off with Pakistan must have left a deep psychological impact on the Pakistani military commanders as well as terrorist leaders but will it suffice to bring about a change in their behaviour, let alone their disposition toward India? Highly unlikely.

Quite simply, the Pakistani military as well its sponsored terrorists are determined adversaries with a very high capacity for enduring losses, particularly because of their ideological zeal that constantly motivates them to act against India until their ideals are realized.

Having said that, the Author also does not believe that this reality is lost on the defense and foreign affairs officials in the Indian government, so the question is how does Operation Sindoor really fit in India’s overall policy for Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.

Operation Sindoor Is Not Yet Over

While the hostilities between India and Pakistan ended after the call between the DGMOs of both the countries on May 10^th, the Indian government continues to maintain that its Operation Sindoor is not yet over but temporarily paused.

“Operation Sindoor is not yet over. It’s just a pause, a warning. If Pakistan makes the same mistake again, India’s answer will be even harsher,” said India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh while addressing officers and sailors onboard India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant off the Goa coast on May 30^th.  

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh speaking onboard INS Vikrant pic.twitter.com/1WJuBoIdPr

— Sidhant Sibal (@sidhant) May 30, 2025

Now, this statement by the Indian Defense Minister gives an impression that he is simply trying to warn Pakistan against any further misadventure by threatening a harsher response if the latter does not heed his advice.

In which case, it is probably not so noteworthy, however, if we go by the history of terror attacks inside India by Pakistan-linked terrorist organisations and India’s responses to them that began after the Uri attack of 2016, there appears to be a loophole which the Pakistan-sponsored terrorists have perhaps been exploiting which may come to an end from here onward, and it is in this context that the Indian Defense Minister’s statement could hold considerable significance.

The Uri attack of 2016 which caused the death of 19 Indian soldiers, was responded to, by India through Surgical Strikes across the LOC, targeting terrorist camps inside Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK).

In less than a week after India’s Surgical Strikes, terrorists belonging to Pakistan-sponsored Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), the same terror outfit that was responsible for the Uri attack, carried out an attack on an Indian Army camp in Baramulla district of the erstwhile state of J&K, which killed 3 Indian soldiers. However, there was no Indian retaliatory response to this attack.

A month later, there was another terror attack, again by terrorists affiliated with JeM, this time on the Indian Army base in Nagrota town of J&K in which 7 Indian Army personnel were killed. Even this attack went without any Indian retaliatory response.

Thereafter, in July 2017, another Pakistan-sponsored terror outfit, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), attacked a civilian bus in J&K, transporting Hindu pilgrims from Amarnath Temple in the Kashmir Valley. Even this attack, which led to the death of 8 Hindu pilgrims, went without any Indian retaliatory response.

Eight months down the line, there was another terror attack, this time by JeM, targeting Indian Army’s Sunjuwan Military Station in the city of Jammu in J&K, which caused the death of 6 Indian Army personnel and 1 civilian. This attack also went without any Indian retaliatory response.

It was not until the Pulwama attack of February 2019, also carried out by JeM, which caused the death of 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, that the Indian government responded with its famous Balakot air strikes.

So, between India’s Surgical Strikes of 2016 and Pulwama attack of 2019, there were four terror attacks inside India that were carried out by Pakistan-sponsored terror outfits which led to the deaths of 13 Indian military personnel and 9 civilians, which begs to question why India did not respond earlier.

Similar pattern emerged in the years leading up to the Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025 despite India’s Balakot air strikes of 2019, which begs to question if any deterrence was even established by India.

The lack of retaliatory response from the Indian side to terror attacks with single digit death counts seems to have created an impression among the Pakistani terrorist leaders and their backers in the Pakistani military apparatus that there is this unsaid and unwritten threshold of the Indian government, and only when that threshold is crossed will there be a retaliation from the Indian side.⁴

After all, India’s extensive cross-border strikes inside Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK) on the opening day of its Operation Sindoor can be categorised as merely an amplified version of the Balakot air strikes, which came only after 26 deaths, and its ensuing rounds of military exchange with Pakistan only occurred because the latter refused to take the off-ramp provided by India and instead tried to retaliate.

So, from a larger strategic perspective of establishing deterrence vis-à-vis Pakistan, the Author believes that the Indian government has done nothing significant so far except maintaining that Operation Sindoor is not yet over.

This could mean that any future terror attack by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists inside India – which can come after a week from now, a month from now, or a year from now – irrespective of its casualty count may result in the resumption of India’s cross-border attacks inside Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK).

So, unlike in the past, when India refrained from a retaliatory response when 1) Pakistan-linked terrorists killed three Indian soldiers in an attack on an Indian Army camp less than a week after India’s Surgical Strikes in 2016 or 2) when Pakistan-linked terrorists attacked a CRPF patrol party, killing five CRPF personnel after only four months of India’s Balakot Air Strikes of 2019, any future misadventure from Pakistan-sponsored terrorists could be met with a strong kinetic response from the Indian side.

Also important to consider, is the new red line established by the Indian government after the cessation of its hostilities with Pakistan on May 10^th, which is that another Pakistan-based terror attack would be considered an ‘act of war’.

“India has never accepted mediation, does not accept it, and will never accept it.”
PM Modi’s message to President Trump.

India now sees terrorism not as a proxy game, but as a direct act of war. pic.twitter.com/ee4oqLQpJL

— Smriti Z Irani (@smritiirani) June 18, 2025

This declaration implies that any future terror attack originating from Pakistan on Indian territory will provoke a retaliatory kinetic response that targets not just terrorist infrastructure but also military installations inside Pakistan as well as PoJK.

So, overall, India appears to have not only revised its threshold for a retaliatory response against Pakistan-based terror attack but also widened the scope of its forthcoming retaliatory kinetic action significantly, which is true, increases the potential cost of terrorism for Pakistan exponentially.

In the aftermath of Pahalgam terror attack, the Pakistani military lost several of its offensive and defensive capabilities which will take considerable resources and possibly even time to rebuild, meaning now the Pakistani military leadership will be compelled to consider its own potential losses every time it decides to foment trouble inside India.

In addition to that, India’s revised threshold for a retaliatory response potentially increases the likelihood of recurring conflicts, thereby imposing a significant limit on Pakistan’s ability to foment trouble inside India.

This is because, Pakistan’s capacity as a country to endure pain is limited by its fragile economy and occasional dependence on international loan assistance, despite the high resolve of its military apparatus to act against India, meaning the overall Pakistani establishment cannot realistically hope to sustain a higher frequency of iterative conflicts with India.⁵

Therefore, India’s Operation Sindoor, which is still ongoing, is perhaps the country’s most substantive action so far on the issue of Pakistan-based terrorism, as it appears to be aimed not just at re-establishing deterrence vis-à-vis Pakistan but also sustaining it for the long haul.

 

Tanmay Kadam is a geopolitical observer based in India. He has experience working as a Defense and International Affairs journalist for EurAsian Times. He can be contacted at tanmaykadam700@gmail.com

1. Navroop Singh, Operation Sindoor: India’s Military Doctrine of Offensive Defence, DD News, June 1^st, 2025 ↩︎
2. Dr Walter Ladwig, Calibrated Force: Operation Sindoor and the Future of Indian Deterrence, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security (RUSI), May 21^st, 2025 ↩︎
3. Harsh V. Pant & Yogesh Joshi, Operation Sindoor and Beyond: India’s Response and Pakistani Calculus, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), May 08^th, 2025 ↩︎
4. Sushant Sareen, From Pahalgam to the LoC: India-Pakistan Tensions near Breaking Point, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), April 23^rd, 2025 ↩︎
5. Sanjeet Kashyap, Operation Sindoor and the Evolution of India’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), June 02^nd, 2025 ↩︎