India’s Operation Sindoor is probably the most meaningful action the country has taken to combat Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, as it appears to be aimed not just at reinstating deterrence against Pakistan but also maintaining it for the future.
On the intervening night of May 6th and 7th, India launched its most extensive cross-border strikes inside Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK) since its Balakot air strikes of 2019, targeting several terrorist facilities in the region, in response to the brutal killing of over two dozen tourists by Pakistan-linked terrorists in the Pahalgam region of India’s Union Territory (UT) of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on April 22nd.
These cross-border strikes were part of India’s military operation, designated as ‘Operation Sindoor’ which was initially intended to be a non-escalatory kinetic action aimed at striking only the terrorist-linked targets, however, it got expanded over several days after Pakistan retaliated, involving multiple rounds of missile and drone attacks by both countries against each other, as well as artillery shelling along the Line of Control (LoC) – the de-facto border between India and Pakistan along the J&K region.
This non-escalatory kinetic action of India lasted for around 25 minutes and is said to have neutralised over 80 terrorists affiliated with Pakistan’s state-sponsored terror outfits Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizbul Mujahideen.
The Author had published an article a few days before India undertook its Operation Sindoor, in which he had pointed out that the Pahalgam terror attack had broken the deterrence that was established by India with its Balakot Air Strike in 2019, and India will have to re-establish this deterrence, most probably through a kinetic action inside Pakistan, that is of the order of magnitude comparable to or surpassing that of Surgical Strikes in 2016 and Balakot Air Strikes in 2019.
However, India’s Operation Sindoor far exceeded the Author’s expectations in terms of its scope and intricacy, necessitating an assessment of the potential implications of this military operation for the future course of this uneasy coexistence between India and Pakistan since 1947.
Now, to assess the potential implications of India’s Operation Sindoor, it is first important to ascertain whether this military operation was able to accomplish its purpose, which according to many experts, was to re-establish the deterrence vis-à-vis Pakistan by inflicting significant costs to the latter as a punishment for its sponsorship of terrorism against India.
So, this article will first present a brief discussion of some strategically relevant and undisputed facts relating to India’s Operation Sindoor, and then attempt to gauge its prospects for India in dealing with Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
So, let us begin.
Operation Sindoor
As stated earlier, ‘Operation Sindoor’ began with the Indian Air Force (IAF) conducting the 25-minute cross-border strikes on nine terror targets inside PoJ&K and Pakistan’s Punjab province which included terrorist training camps and logistical nodes.
These cross-border strikes were conducted using stand-off precision weapons which resulted in the destruction of headquarters and several training facilities of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), as well as a major training facility of Hizbul Mujahideen.
The destruction of these nine terror targets has been corroborated by open source intelligence (OSINT) experts using private satellite imagery, which is available in the public domain.
Also, as discussed earlier, over 80 terrorists affiliated with the aforesaid terror outfits were neutralised in these cross-border strikes, and these included several high-value targets (HVTs) such as Abdul Rauf Azhar, the supreme commander of JeM and one of the brothers of JeM founder Masood Azhar, and most importantly, the mastermind behind the abduction and beheading of Wall Street Journal correspondent Daniel Pearl in 2002.
These cross-border strikes were followed by an aerial dogfight between two countries which entailed Beyond Visual Range (BVR) and close-range kinetic engagements with both sides losing some air assets, however, all pilots were accounted for on the Indian side.
On May 8th and 9th, Pakistan attempted retaliatory strikes by launching offensive drones at several locations inside India, however, the latter’s integrated air defense network which included the Russian-supplied S-400 along with some homegrown systems like the Akash surface-to-air-missile (SAMs) and L-70 anti-aircraft guns, was able to intercept and neutralize all the incoming aerial threats from Pakistan.
After that, on May 10th, the IAF conducted another strike inside Pakistan, this time targeting the country’s airbases with BrahMos cruise missiles and other stand-off weapons. This airstrike severely damaged critical infrastructure at eleven of Pakistan’s airbases which included hardened aircraft hangars, radar systems, command centers, as well as the Chinese-supplied air defense systems protecting these airbases.
Among the Pakistani airbases struck by the IAF was Nur Khan Airbase, located just 25 km from Islamabad and in close proximity to the Pakistan Army Headquarters as well as its nuclear command facilities. This airbase is believed to be associated with Pakistan’s nuclear oversight and mobility networks, and post-strike satellite imagery shows crater impacts near areas suspected of housing nuclear-linked assets.
Shortly after this airstrike, the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan corresponded with each other via a call, which brought this military stand-off to a pause. The Indian government, though, maintains that Operation Sindoor is not over but temporarily halted.
Now, combat often leads to losses and no country is an exception to this, as even the Americans have faced F-16 losses at the hands of Ukrainian pilots and American MQ-9 reaper drones have been shot down by Yemeni Houthis.1
Therefore, even if losses were incurred by both India and Pakistan on the first day of the aforesaid military stand-off, simply comparing their respective losses in isolation is not going to offer any valuable insights from a larger strategic perspective.
The more important fact here is that India’s military was able to carry out a 25-minute long cross-border strikes so deep inside Pakistan as well as conduct follow-on attacks days later on Pakistan’s forward airbases which were defended by Chinese-supplied air defense systems.2
Another important fact is the restraint exercised by India on the first day by restricting its cross-border attacks only to terrorist-linked sites inside Pakistan, going so far as to refrain from even pre-emptively suppressing Pakistani air defence systems.
This restraint increased operational risks for the Indian aerial assets but was still deliberately exercised by the IAF, so as to send a clear message that India did not want to start a conflict with the Pakistani state, and its objectives were limited to destroying terrorist infrastructure inside that country.
It was based on the precise targeting information provided by India’s intelligence agencies and its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, as well as the ability of its air force to carry out precision strikes deep inside Pakistan’s territory while accepting heightened operational risks, that New Delhi was able to frame this cross-border strike as being a non-escalatory kinetic action aimed at striking only the terrorist-linked targets.
Nevertheless, for some reason, Pakistan still perceived these cross-border strikes against terrorists as an attack on itself, and undertook retaliatory strikes, however, these strikes were unsuccessful because of the success of India’s air defense systems, and when India undertook another round of airstrikes inside Pakistan, the latter’s air defense platforms could not mimic the success of their Indian counterpart systems.
So, India’s airstrikes on May 10th impaired the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) sortie capability by grounding several of its squadrons, thereby essentially incapacitating Pakistan’s ability to indulge in second or third round of escalation.
And, this is precisely where India’s Operation Sindoor exceeded the Author’s expectation. In a previous article, the Author had postulated that if India does respond to the Pahalgam terror attack via a military action inside Pakistan with a preparedness to dominate the escalation ladder, then it must be prepared to sustain significant losses in terms of lives and resources itself.
However, India managed to dominate the escalation ladder not just by climbing up the ladder but also by ensuring that Pakistan could not climb it up any further. That said, all this is good when speaking only from the military perspective. The real question, though, is what does this mean from a larger strategic perspective for India.
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