China’s Economic Measures To Influence The Residents Of Taiwan’s Offshore Islands
The Grey Zone tactics being undertaken by China in conjunction with the increasing incursions by its China Coast Guard in Taiwan’s restricted waters, as described in the previous two sections, is aimed at contesting Taiwan’s jurisdiction by challenging Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) directly as well as indirectly by coercing the residents of Taiwan’s outlying islands so as to erode their trust in their own law enforcement authorities.
In parallel to that, China is also attempting to use economic enticements to manipulate public opinion on Taiwan’s outlying islands, Kinmen archipelago in particular, which is uniquely susceptible to Chinese influence due to its geography, history, and economy.
Now, Geography is already discussed before, which is its close proximity to mainland China.
So, coming to the History, Kinmen was part of Taiwan’s Cold War-era fortress frontline against China and following the drawdown of the military garrison, which numbered over 100,000 at the height of the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, both sides tried to leverage the archipelago’s geographic proximity to mainland China through the “Three Mini Links” program, which established limited postal, transportation, and trade links between China and Kinmen.
This created long-standing economic issues for Kinmen, as its economy became dependent on tourism from China. Other than tourism industry, Kinmen also has a small export sector, also dependent on access to nearby Chinese market.
China is pushing unilateral infrastructure projects to connect with Kinmen and Matsu by trying to leverage their economic dependence on mainland China.
In September 2023, China announced plans to make its Fujian province ‘a demonstration zone for integrated development’ with Taiwan.
Based on the plan, Beijing intends to focus on the integrated development between China’s coastal cities, including Xiamen and Fuzhou, and Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen and Matsu islands. The proposed measures include facilitating the supply of water, electricity, and gas, in addition to the construction of bridges linking the Chinese cities with the Taiwanese islands.
The initiative also echoed the central government’s plan to offer Taiwanese migrants ‘equal’ and ‘universal’ access to social security and housing, in order to expedite their integration into Chinese society.
Additionally, the plan also proposed improving cross-strait transportation by building ‘shared airports’ and the Xiamen–Kinmen bridge, which China has unilaterally started constructing, with the first trestle of the Xiamen section completed in May 2024.
However, the completion of the bridge is contingent upon Taiwan’s approval, an issue that was a significant focus during the 2024 Taiwanese elections. The Kinmen County government is supportive of the project because of the potential economic advantages of linking Kinmen with the far larger Xiamen market in China.
Another reason why the people of Kinmen look upon China’s proposed infrastructure projects favorably is the backdrop of China-Kinmen water pipeline that was established in 2018, which now supplies more than 70% of the island’s water usage, thereby addressing Kinmen’s historical water scarcity.
That said, China’s proposed Xiamen–Kinmen bridge should also be seen as Beijing’s bid to capitalize on the political rifts generated between Kinmen and Taiwan by the Kinmen-Lieyu bridge project, which was a Taiwanese infrastructure project that now links Kinmen’s main island with the smaller Lieyu Island.3
Previously, the only connection between Lieyu Island and Kinmen was through a ferry, which had limited capacity and availability. So, the Taiwanese politicians promoted the bridge project to improve the quality of life for the Lieyu residents by facilitating access to vital services, healthcare, economic opportunities, and boosting tourism.
However, the bridge faced backlash for its delays and budget overruns, in addition to its failure to facilitate access to needed social services because of the limited services within Kinmen County itself, with residents having to go to Taiwan’s main island to seek necessary healthcare and employment opportunities on Taiwan’s main island.
Thus, when Taiwan’s bridge project fell short of delivering the necessary social services to Kinmen, Chinese media began promoting narratives that sought to exploit the prevailing discontent in Kinmen with Taiwan’s governance model and investment in a bid to garner support for the Chinese Communist Party’s economic and unification narrative.
A recent example of this can be the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office’s (TAO) press conference held in August, in which the TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian, after declaring the successful completion of “technical preparations” for the electrification and bridge construction linking Fujian and Kinmen, criticized Taiwanese officials by saying that the restrictions imposed by Taiwan’s Democratic People’s Party (DPP) officials had obstructed the revival of direct passenger flights across the strait.
As stated earlier, China has also built a new airport in Xiamen, next to its proposed Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge project, which is slated to open in 2026. Apparently, Beijing intends to replace Kinmen’s own Shangyi Airport as the principal connection between Taiwan to Kinmen with its own airport in Xiamen, which would enable China to control all air travel to Kinmen.
Externally, China promotes the Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge project and Xiamen Xiang’an Airport to the residents of Kinmen by emphasizing their economic benefits but the Chinese domestic media depicts these projects as crucial steps toward the integration of Kinmen and, in the future, the whole of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland.4
Nevertheless, quite a substantial portion of the population of Kinmen remain keen toward establishing infrastructure links with mainland China, as they believe that connectivity with China will be beneficial to their long-term economic prospects.
For example, Yen Da-jen, an 83-year-old businessman in Kinmen, is cited in a report by Voice Of America (VOA) as having said in a phone interview that “The proposed plan wants to increase the connectivity between Xiamen and Kinmen, which will be good for the development of Kinmen”
Let us now take also an example of Matsu or what is officially called Lienchiang County. The Magistrate of Lienchiang County, Wang Chung-ming, has been promoting a 27.2-kilometer-long bridge directly linking Matsu to China’s Fujian province. A report by Taiwan News in May 2024 cites Wang as saying that over the past two decades or so, increasing transport links with China’s Fujian province have made life more convenient for Matsu’s people.
The proposed bridge project would link Matsu’s Nangan Island with Langqi Island and the highway network of Fujian in China, which would facilitate the provision of electricity and natural gas to the islands, thereby connecting Lienchiang County to China’s power grid.
Wang attended a meeting between Matsu and Chinese local government officials in May 2024, during which a proposal for this 27.2-kilometer road bridge was discussed.
In February 2025, Soong Kuo-cheng (宋國誠), a researcher on Taiwan-China affairs at Taiwan-based National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations, hinted at a risk of potential integration of Kinmen and Xiamen, or Matsu and Fuzhou, into one big city, as part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) “united front” tactics aimed at creating an “unnamed, but real ‘one country, two systems’.”
He pointed out the CCP’s proposed idea of a “Kinmen-Xiamen Common Living Circle,” which is aimed at building an integrated transportation network between Taiwan’s Kinmen County and China’s Xiamen, and postulated that if Kinmen and Xiamen become integrated as if they are one city, the CCP could create an impression of this as being a “one country, two systems” to further its narrative of Taiwan and China being “one family.”
According to Soong, the CCP could start from small areas and gradually expand to wider areas, and once it demonstrates that the “one country, two systems” is effective, local residents might also support it.
Furthermore, to expedite the process of integrating and unifying mainland China with Taiwan, the CCP is also said to have granted permission for Taiwanese citizens to apply for Chinese ID cards in Fujian Province while retaining their Taiwan passport or ID card, thus allowing them to hold both documents.
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