Is The United States Looking To Make A Quite Comeback In Afghanistan To Reassert Its Primacy In Asia’s Strategic Heartland?

What About Al-Qaeda?

The ISKP is not the only transnational terrorist outfit in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda also resides in Afghanistan with the Taliban’s blessings and provides a legitimacy to the Taliban regime’s Sharia-based governance in the country.

It was Al-Qaeda’s terror attack of September 11^th, 2001, targeting the Twin Towers in the United States that resulted in the US’ invasion of Afghanistan that ultimately led to the ouster of the erstwhile Taliban regime.

So, if the Taliban reaches some sort of an overt understanding with the US, it could result in a fallout with the Al-Qaeda. Or, just like in Iraq where the erstwhile Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) evolved into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in Afghanistan also the ISKP could replace the Al-Qaeda by absorbing its fighters that would be unhappy with the Taliban’s cooperation with the US.

As stated earlier, the notion of resistance to foreign occupation is deeply entrenched in the psyche of Afghan people which could start find an outlet in a big way via ISKP and/or the Al-Qaeda.

So, the question is whether the Trump administration is able to impress upon the Taliban leadership that the benefits of cooperation with the US far outweigh their allegiance to the transnational terror outfits like Al-Qaeda and that with the help of the US, the Taliban regime can safeguard its continued rule over Afghanistan from threats posed either by Al-Qaeda or the ISKP.

This is very difficult to achieve but not entirely impossible if the reports surrounding the US’ assassination of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second general emir of Al-Qaeda, in 2022 are to be believed.

A report by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2023 sheds light on the internal rifts within the Taliban leadership which is said to be divided between two primary factions:

1. the ‘Kandahar group’ which is said to comprise primarily of clerics close to the Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada
2. the ‘Kabul-based group’ which “represents the Haqqanis and much of the working de facto cabinet in the capital, including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, acting Defence Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqub Omari and head of the General Directorate of Intelligence Abdul Haq Wassiq.”

The report described the Kandahari faction as “isolationist, more religiously conservative and unmoved by international opinion”, while the Kabul-based group, though not particularly moderate, was described as “pragmatic and willing to engage internationally”.

According to experts, the rifts within the Taliban encompass several matters of governance like differing interpretations of Islamic law and its enforcement, power distribution, relationships with militant organisations, etc.

And, interestingly, it is the Kandahari faction who is said to view the relationship with transnational militant organisations like Al-Qaeda as diplomatic liability, while the Haqqanis tend to be in favor of protecting such groups.

It was the Haqqani’s who provided the safe house for Zawahiri in the Sherpur neighbourhood of Kabul which is their stronghold.

And, based on these known rifts within the Taliban leadership, it was also speculated that elements within the Kandahari faction of the Taliban might have leaked Zawahiri’s location to the United States to rid themselves of what they saw as a diplomatic liability, and also weaken the Haqqani faction.

This is because the drone strike by the US’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which killed Zawahiri happened at the safe house in Sherpur that belonged to the top aide of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani faction and the Interior Minister in the Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan.

So, the killing of a high-profile guest like Zawahiri in a safehouse provided by the Haqqani’s in their stronghold was seen as a massive security failure, damaging the credibility of Sirajuddin Haqqani as Afghanistan’s security chief.

Also, a year after this drone strike, that is in July 2023, the then US President Joe Biden made a public remark suggesting a backchannel counterterrorism cooperation with the Taliban.

“Remember what I said about Afghanistan? I said al-Qaida would not be there. I said it wouldn’t be there. I said we’d get help from the Taliban,” said Biden while addressing a press conference at the White House, which led to speculation that the US may have received intelligence of Zawahir’s location from elements within the Taliban.

That being said, some developments in recent months suggest that the Haqqani faction may have taken a substantial step toward engagement with the US or at least a tacit cooperation. For instance, in March 2025, the US removed its multi-million dollar bounties for top leaders of the Haqqani faction including Sirajuddin Haqqani, Aziz Haqqani and Yahya Haqqani – a major link to the Al-Qaeda – who were included in the list of the US’ Rewards for Justice program.  

These removals coincided with the Taliban’s release of American citizens, George Glezmann and Faye Dail Hall. Experts at the US-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) described this as a ‘’quid pro quo’ between the Taliban and the US and a significant step toward the de-facto legitimization of Sirajuddin Haqqani.

So, it is possible that the Taliban regime could eventually decide to abandon some of its old ways to ensure its continued rule over Afghanistan with the help of security and financial assistance as well as investments from the United States. Though, apparently very unlikely at the moment.

Conclusion

Now, at this point, the Author must remind the readers that this article as stated earlier, intends to articulate the contours of the uncertainty surrounding the US’ ongoing backchannel engagement with Taliban, which in effect means trying to enumerate the conservative and optimistic estimates of the potential outcomes of this ongoing dialogue.

So, this article is basically a brainstorming session by the Author to avoid any lack of imagination which is often the cause for failure in the field of strategic intelligence.

Having said that, now let us also try and bring all those far-fetched ideas discussed until the beginning of this section, under the leash of realism.

Broadly speaking, the US has three primary levers that it can utilise in its ongoing engagement with the Taliban: 1) Unfreezing the US$7 billion in frozen funds, 2) Recognition of the Taliban regime that is currently blocking the foreign investment, 3) the intelligence cooperation on the subject of ISKP.

By offering to provide intelligence cooperation on the issue of the ISKP, the Trump administration could negotiate a clandestine military presence under the guise of joint intelligence hubs or technical advisors which could be framed as consultative rather than military presence.

So, this will most likely be a non-combat presence and it will not suffice to realize the kind of power projection needed to assert influence in the neighbouring regions.

If the Trump administration is willing to offer something more substantial such as partial unfreezing of Afghanistan’s overseas assets or lifting of sanctions to enable foreign investments, then maybe it could also push for the use of Afghan airspace or even emergency landing rights for its drones.

Anything more than this may perhaps require the US to diplomatically recognize the Taliban regime. One workaround could be that just like China, even the US does not officially recognize the Taliban regime but it can appoint a diplomatic mission inside Afghanistan which also need not necessarily be an ambassador-level mission but must have all the rights that any embassy in a foreign country enjoys under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).

That way, the US can maintain a presence that is less diplomatic and heavier on the military and intelligence aspect. Of course, this will also not suffice to reassert the kind of US primacy that was possible with the control of Bagram Airbase but it could be a start.

The US could thereafter offer to deploy its unmanned aerial assets (UAS) in Afghanistan which will be operated exclusively by a limited number of US troops but at the discretion of the Taliban which can be shrouded in ambiguity.

Such an arrangement will enable the US to use its UAS(s) for offensive operations against the ISKP operatives in the bordering regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan but at the behest of Taliban, while also utilising them for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes targeting China toward which the Taliban can turn a blind eye.

The question is, can the US get anything beyond this from the Taliban with the help of the aforesaid levers, and the Author remains unsure of that which is why the prospect of a US-funded Wakhan transit route was discussed before because such an offering can be rightfully justified by the US as warranting of a permanent military presence in Afghanistan.

So, there are several ways in which the US can return militarily inside Afghanistan if both the Trump administration as well as the Taliban regime are able to come up with creative ways to complement each other’s pragmatic national interests.

Tanmay Kadam is a geopolitical observer based in India. He has experience working as a Defense and International Affairs journalist for EurAsian Times. He can be contacted at tanmaykadam700@gmail.com.

References

1. XU WEIWEI, China urges unfreezing of Afghanistan’s overseas assets, CHINA DAILY, December 16^th, 2024 ↩︎
2. Pakistan’s role in the Kabul Gurdwara attack has been established, and its mounting despondency is becoming starkly evident, April 10^th, 2020, European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS) & Afghan Intelligence Team Nabs Daesh Leader in South: NDS, April 4^th, 2020, TOLO News ↩︎
3. Priyadarshini Baruah, The Blame Game: ISKP and the Fog of Geopolitical Rivalries, March 27^th, 2025, Journal of World Affairs ↩︎
4. Ibid ↩︎
5. Priyadarshini Baruah, Pakistan’s Perilous Gambit: ISKP vs the Taliban and Baloch, September 24^th, 2025, Observer Research Foundation (ORF) ↩︎