What Is Behind China’s Unreasonable Demands At The LAC?

As the author had previously pointed out, much of the thinking in China’s foreign and security policy is driven by its competition with the United States (US)for global supremacy, and that includes the Chinese policy for the Indian Subcontinent as well. The subcontinent is positioned in such a way that a country that dominates it can exert a strong influence over the maritime activity in the Indian Ocean, which is an essential requirement for China in its competition with the US, as the Indian Ocean happens to be a major trade route for China’s energy and raw materials supplies that could come under threat in the event of a conflict with the US.

So, how does Arunachal Pradesh factor in all of this? Over 300 km northeast of Tawang, a river known as the ‘Yarlung Tsangpo River’ in Tibet, enters into India near the village of Gelling in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, and from there it flows southwest as the ‘Brahmaputra’ through another Indian state called Assam to enter into Bangladesh where it becomes ‘Jamuna’ before it drains into the Indian Ocean.

China’s control over the upper reaches of this river, which flows through Tibet, gives an impression that it can regulate the river’s flow into India and Bangladesh, creating water scarcity for these two countries that depend heavily on it for water supply. However, the interesting reality is that while two-thirds of this river flows through Tibet, most of its water actually collects in Arunachal Pradesh, and therefore it becomes so important for Beijing to occupy this region.

Control over such a crucial water supply could afford China a huge leverage in diplomatic and economic engagements with Bangladesh, which it could potentially use to acquire overseas basing rights for the PLA Navy in that country. This constitutes China’s core geopolitical interests in the Indian Subcontinent, and it is in this context that we must view the Chinese behaviour at Yangtse in recent years.

Also, the Doklam military standoff of 2017 between India and China should also be viewed in this exact context, and is important to be discussed briefly here to understand China’s commitment to fulfilment of its core geopolitical interests. Doklam is a plateau located in a tri-junction area between China’s Yadong County to the north, Bhutan’s Ha District to the east and the Indian state of Sikkim to the west.

This plateau is claimed by both China and Bhutan, and the latter has a ‘special relationship’ with India as part of the ‘Treaty of Friendship’ signed in August 1949, which makes Bhutan India’s protected state. So, when the Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending an existing road southward in Doklam to change the status quo in this area, India intervened in Bhutan’s favour by dispatching 270 armed Indian troops with two bulldozers to stop the construction of this road. 

The Doklam plateau’s significance lies in the fact that it overlooks the ‘Chumbi Valley’ that projects southwards from the Tibetan plateau and runs between the Indian state of Sikkim and Bhutan, pointing toward India’s Siliguri Corridor in such a manner that makes it a good staging area for an attack on this corridor, which happens to be India’s only connection to its Northeastern states. 

Now, simply occupying Arunachal Pradesh is not going to be enough, as China also has to sever any connection between India and its Arunachal Pradesh to prevent any Indian attempts at taking back its territory from China, and that is why occupying Doklam plateau becomes important.

So, the Doklam military standoff of 2017 goes to demonstrate that China has been undertaking concerted efforts since at least the past seven years to prepare for the potential takeover of not just Arunachal Pradesh but the entire Northeastern region of India.

Importance Of Yangtse To Occupy Arunachal Pradesh

Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh is China’s gateway to Northeast India. It was through Tawang that the current Dalai Lama entered India from Tibet, more than half a century ago.

Within Tawang, Yangtse is a massive plateau at an altitude of 15000-15500 feet that offers clear visibility of much of the surrounding area, and therefore it is important for both the Indian and Chinese armed forces.

This plateau is bordered by the LAC on its north which is actually a continuous ridgeline of high mountain peaks ranging from 14,000 to 17,000 feet that runs in a southwest–northeast direction toward the Tulung La mountain pass.

At present, it is India that has control of the Yangtse plateau and the ridgeline bordering the plateau in the north. The Indian army occupied this area in 1987 in response to the Chinese intrusion in Sumdorong Chu. To defend its control over this area, the Indian army has placed a network of frontline posts along this ridgeline.

The control of the ridgeline affords the Indian army a clear view of Chinese military posts across the LAC in Cona County as well as their maintenance routes. However, if China were to acquire control of this ridgeline and the Yangtse plateau, then the Chinese military will gain unrestricted view of the roads leading to a high-altitude mountain pass between Tawang and West Kameng districts of Arunachal Pradesh, called the ‘Sela Pass’, which happens to be India’s only access in and out of Tawang region. While India has constructed an all-weather tunnel through the pass, all traffic in and out of Tawang will still be visible from the Yangtse Plateau. So, control of Yangtse will enable the Chinese to cut-off India’s access to Tawang.

Also, along the north-west of Yangtse plateau runs a ridgeline that has two important heights, namely the Kharsang La and Chemakarpo La mountain peaks, each having an altitude of over 17,000 feet. These mountain peaks offer the Indian military an unrestricted view of China’s Nahdoh bowl region, from where the Chinese offensive had begun in the 1962 Indo-China war. However, if the Chinese were to occupy these heights, they would get a clear view of the entire Tawang Valley together with the Bum la area in India. Now, these particular heights along this ridgeline are only approachable from the Yangtse plateau.

So, to be able to mount a successful offensive for occupying Tawang and then defend its occupation against any Indian counteroffensive, the Chinese military has to first take control of the Yangtse plateau, which should suffice to explain why it is so important for China to change the status quo in this region.

Quite simply, the PLA must acquire control of the Yangtse plateau, that is, if China is serious about realising its core geopolitical interest in the Indian subcontinent. In the words of Lt Gen Shantanu Dayal (Retd) of the Indian Army, “For the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), Yangtse is perhaps the most sought after feature in the Eastern Sector.”

Is China Inching Slowly Toward Another Major Confrontation With India?

At present, it is the Indian military that controls the Yangtse plateau and the ridgeline bordering this plateau along the LAC, which puts India in an advantageous position, however, China has responded to this by having invested heavily in infrastructure development in order to erode India’s advantage.

For instance, as stated earlier the Indian military maintains a network of frontline posts at the commanding heights along the ridgeline overlooking the area which affords it a significant measure of tactical advantage to counteract Chinese incursions. However, shortly after the clash between the Indian and Chinese troops in December 2022 in Yangtse, a report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), with the help of satellite imagery, had brought out that roads used for supplying these frontline posts were steep dirt tracks that were suffering from erosion and landslides due to poor construction and environmental conditions.

While it remains unknown what is the current condition of these roads but according to the same ASPI report, China has tried to compensate for its tactical disadvantage by building new roads and other infrastructure that has improved its ability to swiftly deploy troops into the area.

For example, as of writing of the ASPI report in question, the PLA had upgraded several major access roads and constructed a new sealed road that lead from Tangwu New Village to within 150 metres of India’s frontline posts along the ridgeline, thereby improving its ability to dispatch troops directly to the LAC. It was this newly constructed road that allowed the PLA troops to move upwards toward the Indian frontline posts during the December 2022 clash. The PLA has also built a camp at the end of this road.

So, while the PLA remains at a disadvantage in minor skirmishes like the one that transpired on December 9, 2022, in a large scale conflict, China’s more robust transport infrastructure that enables rapid deployment of troops at the LAC ridgeline could potentially tip the scales in favour of the PLA, assuming that Indian troops continue to use the same less reliable dirt tracks at the time of such a conflict.