What Is Behind China’s Unreasonable Demands At The LAC?

Moreover, there have been reports of an uptick in the deployment of PLA assets in the regions near the eastern sector of the LAC. In late 2023, India Today published commercial satellite imagery showing a new PLA garrison directly opposite the Tawang sector in a relative depth area of Ritang town in Lhontse county, which is roughly 60 kilometres from the LAC. This garrison reportedly houses a combined arms brigade (CAB) of the PLA. In addition to that, China has also constructed a new dual-use airport in Lhontse county.

Nature Desai, an observer of the Indo-Tibetan frontier, who monitors such developments on the LAC told India Today at the time that these increased developments of PLA assets in the eastern frontier of Indo-Tibetan border areas in the aftermath of the Galwan Valley incident of June 2020, indicate a change in China’s strategic calculations pertaining to Indian border.

“China seems to be augmenting their force deployment along the Tibet-Arunachal Pradesh border areas to gain a perceived upper hand in terms of infrastructure, communication and logistics compared to India,” said Desai.

Desai also pointed out that the new CAB field camp in Ritang town along the bank of Nyel Chu river – which becomes Subansiri River as it enters into Arunachal Pradesh – also strengthens the PLA in the Subansiri frontier of the Indo-Tibetan border. The Subansiri frontier is in central Arunachal Pradesh, and as stated earlier, the Chinese have reportedly demanded access for patrolling along the Subansiri River Valley.

During the war of 1962, China’s military operations in the Subansiri sector were said to be supplementary to its main offensive in the Tawang sector. The objective of Chinese operations in this sector was to annihilate Indian forces in the Limeking village in the Upper Subansiri district and their main thrust was from Longju down the Tsari Chu valley.

The Chinese forces were able to secure Limeking on the morning of November 21st, 1962, after which they continued their advance towards Daporijo, reaching almost as far as Nacho village en route until they received orders to stop and return to Limeking.

In the years 2020-21, the Chinese propped up four villages in the Upper Subansiri district, one of which is in the Tsari Chu valley, and the other three along the Langdong Chu valley to the northeast of Tsari Chu valley. Now, with the backdrop of the 1962 war provided by the author just before, it is not so difficult to imagine what the Chinese thinking behind constructing a new village in the Tsari Chu Valley is.

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Belligerent China's incredible 'Infrastructure Drive' with hegemonic ambitions put India in a vulnerable position along her Northeast Frontier with Tibet.

3 New Villages popped up near the LAC bordering Shi Yomi and Upper Subansiri Districts in the last few months. pic.twitter.com/ccYWUXWLiP

— Nature Desai (@NatureDesai) November 25, 2021

However, with their recent demand for access to conduct patrols along the Subansiri River Valley, and the construction of three new villages along the Langdong Chu valley, the PLA appears to be laying the groundwork for a potential multi-pronged assault on the Subansiri sector in a future conflict with India.

Therefore, China’s latest demands as reported in the media, for its troops to be allowed to patrol two spots, one in the Yangtse area and the other one along the Subansiri river valley, could be an indication of another major confrontation in the making in the eastern sector along the LAC.

That said, it is important to bear in mind that there is already a deep sense of distrust between Indian and Chinese troops because of the ongoing tensions in the eastern Ladakh sector of the LAC, and the fact that both the countries are engaged in continuing infrastructure development on their respective sides of the LAC means that with each passing day it is getting easier for either side to quickly move and deploy troops along the LAC. 

All of this has increased the likelihood of any confrontational incident at the border escalating quite quickly before cooler heads could prevail. So, every major confrontation at the LAC (there have been three so far) is basically going to add to the risk of a full blown Sino-Indian regional conflict, something that the decision makers in both the countries should be mindful of, going ahead. 

How Upcoming BRICS Summit May Figure In The Future Chinese Aggression At The LAC

The series of diplomatic exchanges between India and China since the beginning of this year at several levels and even through semi-official channels such as think tank exchanges had raised expectations of a potential thaw between the two countries.

The new Chinese ambassador to India, Xu Feihong, was said to have been undertaking quiet diplomacy since his arrival in India by meeting with key stakeholders including the Indian EAM Jaishankar and former ambassadors. Notably, Xu Feihong hinted at this before his arrival to India in an interview with the state-run China Global Television Network (CGTN), wherein he said that he would “contact Indian friends from all walks of life, sincerely enhance mutual understanding and trust” to restore normal relations with India.

However, these diplomatic overtures from China may have been aimed at getting India on the same page with its agenda for the upcoming BRICS summit that is going to be held in Russia next week.

China happens to be the most dominant of all BRICS members because of its sheer economic size, and its intentions to supplant the US-led world order are transparent. Also, it is well known how after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the west cut off Russia from the global financial system and stopped importing Russian oil and gas substantially, thereby prompting Moscow to make some strategic adaptations, and thus finding an important ally for itself in China. Moreover, Iran, which is probably the most bitter adversary of the US, is also a member of BRICS now.

So, it is a no-brainer that China, together with Russia and Iran is going to try and position BRICS against the US-led global order. However, this does not exactly align with India’s interests, who considers BRICS as a medium for reform in the current world order by redistributing the global economic power from the US-led G7′ group of developed countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States), to the developing world.

Also important to consider, is China’s planned timeline to replace the US as a preeminent global power. The recent remarks made by retired PLA Colonel Liu Mingfu, known to be one of the most trusted advisors to President Xi Jinping, are noteworthy in this regard.

Liu said in an interview in march that the Sino-US competition has entered its final phase which could last 2-3 decades, making China “the most unsafe country in the world under the increasingly serious threat from the United States” and recommended strengthening the country’s national defense and military construction.

Which is why the upcoming BRICS summit is so important, as Russia, one of China’s most important ally at present, holds the rotating BRICS presidency for 2024, and is going to set the agenda of this year’s BRICS summit that is scheduled to be held in the Russian city of Kazan from October 22nd to 24th.

Yuri Ushakov, President Vladimir Putin’s foreign affairs aide, has stated earlier this year that the agenda of this year’s BRICS summit will be centred on three major areas: politics and security, the economy and finance, and cultural and humanitarian ties. Of these, ‘the economy and finance’ is an area that should be of concern to the US, as it could entail acceleration of efforts to increase the global use of non-dollar currencies (a.k.a. de-dollarization), the Chinese renminbi in particular, which will threaten the US dollar’s hegemony in global trade and finance.

De-dollarization is obviously not an exclusive agenda of China, Russia and Iran, as there is genuine resentment within the Global South countries over the injustices that come with the US’ dollar’s supremacy in the international monetary and financial system.

However, India may not be comfortable with increasing usage of renminbi in international trade because of its long running geopolitical differences with China, as it could become vulnerable to risks of renminbi assets being frozen and renminbi payments channels being shut off (or surveilled) during times of high tensions.

As the author had previously pointed out, China’s increasing aggression at the LAC in recent years is also because of the fact that it is irked by India’s rising stature at the international level, which it sees as a competition to its own rise or as an hindrance to the fulfilment of its own interests at the global level.

An instance of this can be found in an article authored by Hu Shisheng, probably one of China’s most authoritative experts on India, mere months after the Galwan Valley incident in 2020. The article in question was published in the state-owned Global Times, in which Hu accused India of trying to disrupt China’s agenda in multilateral mechanisms as well as internally sabotaging multilateral organisations like BRICS and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation).

“Clearly, India wants to prevent multilateral mechanisms from boosting China’s rise. In the BRICS and SCO, India rarely makes efforts to promote internal unity, but tries to dismantle aspects of them from within,” wrote Hu, who is the director of the Institute for South Asian Studies of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), which is one of China’s most influential think tank and is directly under the Ministry of State Security (MoSS), China’s external intelligence arm.

According to Jayadeva Ranada, President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy (CCAS), the aforesaid article by Hu Shisheng certainly had high-level official approval and its publication in English was obviously intended to ensure wider publicity for China’s views of its relations with India.

So, what happens between India and China during the upcoming BRICS summit may have an impact on China’s behaviour at the border, meaning, if India does not go along with China’s agenda during this summit, it must expect Chinese aggression at the LAC.

Tanmay Kadam is a geopolitical observer based in India. He has experience working as a Defense and International Affairs journalist for EurAsian Times. He can be contacted at tanmaykadam700@gmail.com.