The device developed by the Lishui University engineers was based on a previous patent application, in 2009, for an anchor-shaped “ocean towing type cutting device” by marine engineers at the South China Sea branch of the State Oceanic Administration of China.
“The fact that there are multiple technical patents that Chinese engineers applied for to conduct such a subsea cable cutting operation only adds to the suspicion that Beijing may have not only the motivation, but also is actively developing technical options for completing these sort of subsea warfare operations in the future,” said Benjamin L. Schmitt, Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, in an email to Newsweek.
Taiwan Risks Becoming China’s Boiling Frog: Part 2
In addition to the increasing incidents of alleged Chinese grey zone tactics against Taiwan, there has also been an uptick in the frequency and intensity of Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in recent years.
A comparison of all five large scale military exercises that the PLA has conducted around Taiwan since 2022 goes to show that each exercise has had some unique objectives of its own but there is also an aspect of continuity to these respective objectives, as if they were simulating successive phases of a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan one by one.
China’s Military Exercises In 2022: A Prologue To The ‘CRISIS’
The military exercise conducted by the PLA in August 2022 had myriad reasons behind it. Experts suggest that the PLA would have conducted the exercise with or without Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, given the occasion of the 20th National Party Congress (NPC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
After years of reforms across all the branches of the PLA that were instituted by China’s President Xi Jinping – who also heads the country’s Central Military Commission (CMC) – an exercise of this magnitude was needed ahead of the 20th NPC in October 2022, to demonstrate that the reforms had indeed made the PLA a more joint and combat-capable force.
So, Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan was simply used as a pretext for the PLA’s live fire drills that followed, as it offered Beijing a chance to send a strong political message to Washington about its red lines relating to the island nation’s ties with the US as well as demonstrate its determination to reunite Taiwan with the Chinese mainland.
Simply from a military perspective, the PLA exercise conducted in August 2022 was the largest ever until that time and also the most provocative, as it involved live fire drills, as part of which, around nine or 11 missiles were fired in closure areas surrounding Taiwan and at least four missiles had overflown northern Taiwan itself.
Other than missiles, the PLA is said to have used warplanes to simulate attack against high value targets (HVT) on the ground and deployed PLA Navy ships to practice naval blockade of Taiwan. The PLA described the use of warplanes and naval ships in the exercise as demonstration of its “sea-air joint blockade and control capability” (海空聯合封控能力).
Most importantly, the presence of the PLA Navy ships in the waters east of Taiwan was publicised to showcase the PLA’s capability to close off maritime sea lines of communication (SLOC) into and out of Taiwan.
So, overall, the objective of the PLA military exercise in August 2022 was to demonstrate China’s comprehensive preparedness for a potential invasion of Taiwan, and when we consider all the successive PLA exercises and grey zone activities in the region ever since, perhaps this particular exercise was also meant to set the stage for more expansive military activities in the future.
The PLA’s live fire drills in August 2022 were followed by another exercise in October 2022 in which, multiple fighter jets and bombers circled Taiwan. According to experts, the purpose of this exercise was to test Taiwan’s air defense.
Any potential Taiwan invasion scenario would entail massive bombardment of Taiwan’s military assets such as air defense systems, command and control (C2) infrastructure, warplanes and naval ships, etc.
So, a key element of continuity in the PLA’s exercises in August and October of 2022 was the firing of missiles and the use of fighter jets and bombers, which could be considered as demonstration/simulation of initial phase of a potential Taiwan invasion scenario entailing bombardment of Taiwan’s military assets such as air defense systems, command and control (C2) infrastructure, warplanes and naval ships, etc.
China’s Joint Sword Series Of Exercises: Making Of The ‘CRISIS’
The PLA launched the first of its three ‘Joint Sword’ series of military exercises in April 2023 in response to the former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with the then US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in the US. The exercise simulated joint precision missile strikes on major targets in Taiwan as well as joint naval and air operations to practise encirclement of the island nation.
For the first time, Chinese J-15s were seen inside Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and per the reports, they were launched from two PLA Navy aircraft carriers, one of which was the Shandong.
So, overall, the PLA again intended to demonstrate its capability to surround and isolate Taiwan while also repeating its simulated bombardment of Taiwan’s high value targets, however, some observers categorised this exercise as an escalation from the previous ones. For instance, Guo Zhengliang, a former Taiwanese legislator, told local media that these drills seemed “closer to the actual state of war” in the specifics of operation.
In 2024, PLA repeated the designation, ‘Joint Sword’ for two out of three of its military exercises around Taiwan, however, it added the year ‘2024’ and letters ‘A’ and ‘B’ to this designation, perhaps to demarcate the two exercises as simulations of successive phases in a potential Chinese takeover of Taiwan.
So, the exercise conducted in May 2024, following the current Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, was named as Joint Sword-2024A (聯合利劍-2024A) and it was said to represent the initial phase of a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan, as part of which, the PLA practised joint precision strikes on key Taiwanese land, air and maritime targets as well as entered inside areas close to Taiwan’s air and maritime jurisdictional zones.
Also, the Joint Sword-2024A marked the first time that a PLA exercise included Taiwan’s offshore islands, including Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin as well as participation from China Coast Guard (CCG) in areas around these islands.
According to experts, this exercise was notable for being the largest joint action involving the PLA Navy and CCG vessels until that time, and with the latter undertaking significant activity around Taiwan’s offshore islands, it indicated that Beijing is planning to challenge Taiwan’s jurisdiction over these islands.
The second iteration of this exercise, called the Joint Sword-2024B, took place in October 2024 after the Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s National Day speech on October 10. In this exercise, the PLA’s focus was on quarantining Taiwan’s key ports and areas as well as the joint seizure of comprehensive superiority.
The quarantine of key Taiwanese ports entailed the participation of the PLA Navy for carrying out the blockade against naval vessels and the China Coast Guard (CCG) for operations aimed at non-military ships with the purpose of controlling maritime traffic and inspecting cargo moving in an out of Taiwan’s port.
Notably, in this exercise the CCG vessels had activated their AIS tracking signals with the view to intimidate the Taiwanese and possibly even to routinize their patrols in a bid to further challenge Taiwan’s jurisdiction in the Taiwan strait.
While the PLA had practised seizure of comprehensive superiority in Joint Sword-2024A as well, the second iteration of this exercise was notable for having enhanced the realism of such an operation.
For instance, the PLA aircraft that partook in this exercise took off from the second-line airbases rather than the frontlines one, which was basically a simulation of an eventuality wherein the frontline airbases are destroyed by the enemy in the event of a conflict, and the PLA has to resort to using second-line airfields to ensure continuity of its air operations.
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