Soon after, on November 7, 2025, India signed a US$1 billion contract with General Electric to procure 113 F404 engines, and this was despite the delays in the delivery of 99 F404 engines ordered in 2021, of which only four had been delivered at the time.
So, the purchase underscores the extent to which India is invested in the US’ supplies of critical defence components, particularly jet engines central to the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft programme. The Tejas is a key pillar of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) effort to arrest the decline in fighter squadron strength, replace ageing aircraft, and maintain operational readiness amid China’s expanding military capabilities and its close defence ties with Pakistan.
General Electric has attributed the delivery delays to supply chain disruptions following the COVID-19 pandemic. These delays have directly affected HAL’s ability to meet aircraft delivery timelines for the IAF, an issue that Singh is reported to have raised during his discussions with his American counterpart, Hegseth, on the occasion of the signing of the defence framework agreement.
Thereafter, on November 19th, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced that the US State Department had approved the sale of Javelin anti-tank missile systems and Excalibur guided artillery munitions to India, in a deal valued at approximately US$93 million.
The approval marked India’s first defence procurement under the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme since bilateral relations between the countries soured in August, following the Trump administration’s decision to impose 50 per cent tariffs on Indian goods over New Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian oil.
According to the DSCA, India had requested up to 216 Excalibur precision-guided artillery projectiles and 100 Javelin missile systems as part of the proposed sale.
In sum, India–US defence cooperation deepened steadily, demonstrating resilience amid wider diplomatic frictions.
A Fundamental Tranformation Underway In The India-US Partnership In Energy and Critical Minerals Sector
The India-US energy partnership is moving decisively beyond transactional supply arrangements toward deeper strategic integration. What was once centred on fuel trade and dialogue-driven cooperation is now evolving into a multi-layered relationship spanning long-term LNG investments, advanced technology transfer, and joint positioning in global critical mineral supply chains.
This shift became most explicitly noticeable during India Energy Week (IEW) 2026 in Goa, where the head of the US delegation, Acting US Consul General Mike Schreuder highlighted energy security as a cornerstone of the US’ broader bilateral relationship with India.
“The United States and India are building an energy partnership that delivers real benefits for our people,” said Schreuder.
Our cooperation is centered on action — expanding reliable American energy exports, promoting transparent and market-driven growth, and supporting affordable, dependable energy supplies These efforts strengthen energy security, support economic growth and create opportunities,” he added.
His remarks demonstrated a recognition that energy cooperation is no longer just about meeting demand, but about building resilience against geopolitical shocks, supply disruptions, and technological dependencies.
Now, let us move on from remarks to actual developments. Historically, India’s engagement with the US energy sector was largely transactional. Indian companies signed long-term contracts for crude oil, LNG, and LPG, while cooperation on technology and infrastructure remained limited.
So, one of the most significant shifts underway entails Indian energy companies’ moving from being mere offtakers of the US LNG to becoming equity participants in American liquefaction projects. Rather than relying solely on purchase agreements, Indian firms are seeking ownership stakes that provide greater control over supply, pricing, and long-term availability.
This trend became visible during IEW 2026. On the sidelines of the event, Chairman of India’s state-owned GAIL (India) Limited, Sandeep Kumar Gupta, confirmed that three companies had submitted bids in response to GAIL’s tender to acquire a 26 per cent equity stake in a US-based LNG liquefaction project. According to Gupta, GAIL is targeting facilities that are already operational or nearing Final Investment Decision (FID), while stipulating that any new project must be commissioned by 2030.
India’s Union Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Hardeep Singh Puri also said during the IEW event that Indian companies are interested in equity participation in LNG liquefaction projects in the United States, particularly those under construction or approaching FID.
By favoring equity-linked arrangements, India aims to reduce exposure to spot market volatility and geopolitical disruptions that have repeatedly affected global gas markets in recent years. Ownership stakes also allow Indian buyers to influence operational timelines and mitigate risks associated with delayed commissioning or supply redirection.
Beyond LNG and hydrocarbons, technology cooperation has also emerged as a central pillar of the India–US energy partnership. Over the past several months, the relationship has shifted from high-level dialogue to more focused mechanisms aimed at overcoming long-standing barriers to technology transfer.
In early January 2026, India and the US operationalised the Transforming Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology (TRUST) initiative. Announced during the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US’ in February 2025, the TRUST initiative is designed as an evolution of the earlier ‘initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET)’.
The initiative signals a shared intent to reduce barriers to technology transfer and address export control constraints in several sectors including in areas central to supply chains of critical minerals such as lithium and rare earth elements.
“The leaders determined that their governments redouble efforts to address export controls, enhance high technology commerce, and reduce barriers to technology transfer between our two countries, while addressing technology security. The leaders also resolved to work together to counter the common challenge of unfair practices in export controls by third parties seeking to exploit overconcentration of critical supply chains,” said the India-US joint statement following the meeting between Prime Minister Modi and the US President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C. in February 2025.
While the literature from the Indian government also mentions a bilateral initiative under TRUST involving recovery, processing, and recycling of strategic minerals such as lithium and rare earth that are vital for technologies and supply chain resilience in several downstream applications ranging from electric vehicles and renewable energy systems to defense and aerospace, even if no specific bilateral technology-transfer roadmap has been publicly detailed so far.
Overall, this shift reflects a growing recognition on both sides that energy security increasingly depends on access to processing technologies, not just raw materials.
Now, with that as the backdrop, one can take a look at the the Indian government’s reduction of the Basic Customs Duty on monazite – a principal source of rare earth oxides – to zero as well as exemptions on imported capital goods required for processing critical mineral, with effect from February 2nd, 2026.
This fiscal move significantly improves the commercial viability of deploying advanced foreign technology (probably including from the United States) in Indian processing facilities, and can be considered a measure by the Indian government toward aligning trade policy with its strategic objective to aggressively move up the value chain in critical minerals rather than remain a supplier of raw or semi-processed materials.
What provides ground for the above speculation is the announcement in India’s Union Budget 2026–27, of Dedicated Rare Earth Corridors in Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu. These corridors are designed to cluster mining, processing, refining, and manufacturing activities, supported by targeted infrastructure and policy incentives.1
It builds on a ₹7,280 crore ‘Scheme to Promote Manufacturing of Sintered Rare Earth Permanent Magnets’, approved by the Union Cabinet in November 2025 to support the development of integrated rare earth permanent magnet (REPM) capacity in India.2
India’s resource base for rare earths — including monazite-bearing beach sands across multiple coastal regions — is widely cited as a foundational asset for these policy moves, however, domestic processing capacity remains nascent and will require sustained investment in technology and industrial scale-up.
What has long been a bottleneck for India’s ambitions to commercialise its substantial rare earth reserves, is its technological shortcomings in ‘separation chemistry’ – the complex process of isolating individual rare earth elements like neodymium–praseodymium (NdPr) from monazite sand. NdPr is one of the key inputs for permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, consumer electronics, and grid-scale energy storage services.
So, for India, partnerships with experienced US firms stands to offer access to proven technologies and commercial-scale expertise in this and many other areas. Also, for American companies, India can provide scale, policy support, and an opportunity to diversify processing away from concentrated global supply chains.
Hence, it is plausible that India’s REPM scheme and dedicated Rare Earth Corridors initiative could have an underpinning of a bilateral technology roadmap with the US that could potentially reposition India from being an exporter of ores to a producer of refined oxides and high-value components, and the elimination of basic customs duty in India’s latest budget on capital goods required for the processing and refining of critical minerals is a component in this strategy.