Can President Trump and Republicans Win Back Voters as Cost-of-Living Pain Intensifies Ahead of Midterms?

The public sentiment in the United States is turning more critical of President Donald Trump’s stewardship of the country due to the dissatisfaction over the state of the economy, particularly after the outbreak of conflict with Iran, which caused a spike in fuel prices, adding fresh strain on households already grappling with prolonged inflation. This growing unease among US citizens presents a significant political challenge for Republicans as they approach the upcoming midterm elections.

The Republican leader returned to office in January 2025 with approval at around 50–51%, according to the RealClearPolitics (RCP) polling average at the time, but support has since declined, particularly on the economy. His overall approval rating, as of the writing of this article, stands at 41.1%, reflecting a steady erosion in public backing.

Mr. Trump secured victory in the 2024 presidential race on assurances of stabilizing an economy that had faced a surge in inflation during the administration of former Democratic President Joe Biden. Yet inflationary pressures have persisted, with price growth lingering around 3%, remaining above the 2% threshold widely regarded by policymakers as optimal.

Alongside these economic strains, Mr. Trump moved with Israel to launch a military campaign against Iran, triggering a sharp spike in global energy prices as Iran successfully disrupted the maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The volatility underscored how shifts in oil and gas markets can reverberate across supply chains, affecting everything from industrial inputs to consumer goods. 

Any abrupt shift in energy markets tends to cascade through nearly every corner of the economy, reflecting the central role of oil and natural gas in modern life. These resources underpin a wide range of essentials—from fertilizers and pharmaceuticals to vehicle components, electronic displays, and synthetic textiles—as well as the fuels that power transportation.

So, for many Americans, particularly those living paycheck to paycheck, the rise in fuel costs quickly filtered through to everyday expenses, intensifying financial pressure that had already been building up since the tenure of former President Joe Biden.

With the U.S. midterm elections about seven months away, recent polls suggest the economy is poised to be the decisive factor in the outcome because many Americans prioritize day-to-day expenses such as fuel, food, and housing over overseas conflicts or political spectacle.

That said, this article does not seek to simply echo prevailing U.S. media coverage centered on rising inflation or criticism of the Trump administration alongside bleak electoral projections for Republicans.

This is because that narrative is already well established, and the political projections based on it would be quite in line with the historical trend of U.S. politics, wherein the voters tend to rebalance power by shifting from the President’s Party to the opposition party in the mid-term elections.

Instead, the article seeks to define the contours of this shift—specifically, the form a Republican Party setback in the midterm elections might take, as that is likely to prove most consequential from a governance perspective for the American citizens and multitude of other domestic and overseas stakeholders who stand to be impacted by the shifts in the U.S. political landscape.

It is very common in U.S. politics for the President’s Party to lose control of one chamber of the U.S. Congress while retaining the other. In the past two mid-term elections, the President’s Party lost the House but retained the Senate.

In that scenario, the President’s legislative agenda tends to stall as the opposition gains control over spending bills, and by gaining control of the House, the opposition is also able to launch probes and pursue impeachment of the President.

However, the control of the Senate is able to shield the President from impeachment, as well as allow the administration to confirm federal judges, executive appointments, and ambassadors, preserving its influence over the judiciary and key institutions.

If the President’s party loses the Senate and gains control of the House, the administration’s ability to shape the judiciary and senior levels of government, as well as implement major international agreements (or treaties) gets significantly constrained. Moreover, while the House can still advance legislation aligned with the administration, most measures would face steep hurdles in the Senate, limiting the prospects for enactment without bipartisan support.

However, the House remains under the President’s party’s control, so large-scale hostile investigations are less likely. Overall, the change in control over the Senate causes the most long-term structural impact.

The most consequential shift of power is when the President’s Party loses both chambers of the U.S. Congress, in which case the administration faces near-total legislative gridlock, with the opposition able to block most policy initiatives, control spending legislation, and set the congressional agenda.

Additionally, the administration could also face the burden of intensified investigations and oversight from the House, while the Senate simultaneously stalls or rejects judicial and executive appointments, sharply curtailing both its immediate agenda and long-term institutional influence.

This forces the President and his administration to rely mostly on executive actions to advance policy priorities, as was seen during the former U.S. President Barack Obama’s second term after the Democrats lost the House in 2010 and then the Senate in 2014.

Based on the polling averages currently, Democrats are leading the generic Congressional ballot by roughly 4–5 points, which typically translates into House seat gains, and with the Republicans holding a narrow House majority and the forecasting models suggesting that Republicans could lose 20–30 seats, the flip appears increasingly plausible in the House.¹

The Trump administration and the Republican Party appear aware of the urgency in addressing voter concerns within a roughly six-month window before political repercussions take hold. In response, some measures are being rolled out or are being considered that could help strengthen the personal finances of American households.

The article will take a look at these measures and objectively gauge their potential to improve the economic sentiment among the American citizenry within the next six months, because if the current trends hold through November, then the Democrats could, beyond regaining control of the U.S. House of Representatives, also have a credible path to securing the U.S. Senate.

In the next section, the article will take stock of some polling numbers indicating the overall economic sentiment among the American citizens, after which, the measures being implemented or considered by the Trump administration and the Republican Party to uplift this economic sentiment will be examined.

So, let us begin.

Prices, Wages, and President Trump’s Ratings: A Timeline Since Early 2025

Per the data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the first year of President Trump’s second term, Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the U.S. fell from 3% year-on-year (YoY) in January 2025 to 2.4% in February 2026 before rebounding to 3.3% in March 2026 due to the surge in energy prices following the joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran.

So, excluding the aftermath of the Middle East conflict, the rate of inflation had been slowing since the onset of Trump’s second term, however, from an electoral standpoint, cooling in inflation does not translate into lower prices, leaving ordinary Americans still grappling with steadily rising costs, just at a slower pace.

Total compensation, including wages and benefits like paid leave, rose 3.4% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025 for private-sector workers, inching up to 3.5% by the third quarter. 

Now, that puts the growth rate in wages on par with the rate of inflation, but it is not enough to recover the buying power that the American citizens have been losing since 2022, when inflation soared high up to 9%, and wage increases peaked at 5.5%

As a result, many Americans have been seeing their purchasing power erode, and to fully recover those losses, wages would need to outpace inflation for a sustained period, not just match it.

A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted between February 18-23, 2026, among 4,638 Americans, found that 78% of them said they agreed that inflation is a very big concern for them personally, and that inflation is a shared concern across partisan lines with 73% of Republicans, 86% of Democrats, and 77% of independents saying inflation is a very big concern for them.

Now, coming to President Trump’s job approval, he has historically had very low support among Americans more broadly, so most of his political capital is a function of the strong support he enjoys from the majority of Republican voters.

This means that most, if not all, of Mr. Trump’s eggs are in one basket, and that kind of political capital comes with risks. That said, it also makes the job of analysts a bit easier, cause they only have to check the trends in support among Republican voters to arrive at a reliable judgement of Mr. Trump’s overall political standing.

For instance, according to a survey by Pew Research Center conducted in late January of this year, support for Mr. Trump’s plans and policies has declined significantly over the past year, with the share of Americans backing all or most of his policies falling from 35% to 27%, while those supporting only a few or none rose from 47% to 52%.

Over the same period, the share of Americans who support some of Mr.Trump’s policies rose modestly by three percentage points, from 17% to 20%, however, the Author does not see much of a broader significance in this shift. It is also worth noting that this uptick was recorded before Mr. Trump moved with Israel to launch a military campaign against Iran.

What is more important is that the aforesaid decline in support for Mr. Trump’s plans and policies is said to have been driven entirely by Republicans, where support for all or most of his agenda fell from 67% to 56%.

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