What Is Driving Japan’s Renewed Engagement With Russia?

In an article published on February 24th, the Author had pointed out how the Alaska summit between President Trump and Putin in August 2025 had involved discussions of bilateral energy cooperation between the U.S. and Russia with the possibility of joint projects in the Arctic and Alaska.

Also, there have been reports since the onset of Mr Trump’s second term as the U.S. President, which have been suggesting that the Trump administration could pursue normalisation of economic ties with Russia, regardless of whether the Ukraine crisis gets resolved.

In fact, the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent remarks have only strengthened such speculations.

“We just sort of sensed that there wasn’t a lot of progress being made,” Mr Rubio said in conversation with the reporters on May 22nd. “We’re also not interested in getting involved in an endless cycle of meetings that lead to nothing.”

These remarks by Mr Rubio, together with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s warnings urging the United States and European nations to pull their diplomats and citizens out of Kyiv before Russia begins its ‘systemic strikes’, point to a sharp escalation in the conflict and dim prospects for its near-term resolution.

So, unless the U.S. can prevail upon its European allies to pursue negotiations with Russia through concessions such as easing sanctions, restoring energy ties and normalising relations, as well as press Kyiv toward a compromise settlement, the end of the Ukraine crisis does not appear in sight, at least in the near term.

Now, what does all of this mean for Japan-Russia relations?

It means that either the U.S. has decided to pursue economic normalisation with Russia despite the latter’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and Tokyo could be trying to align itself with Washington.

Or, there is indeed an end in sight to the war in Ukraine, which most of the world distracted by the conflict in the Middle East is oblivious to, except for some, probably including the Japanese leadership. This is a remote possibility, one which can only be realised by the European nations by engaging with both Russia and Ukraine both.

The Author knows how convoluted and extremely speculative all of the above sounds, or reads. Some of you must be reconsidering your subscription to this Substack right about now.

That said, short of the above eventualities coming to pass, the scope of Japan’s recent engagements with Russia should be considered very limited. That’s all the Author wants to say, and hopefully that re-established your trust in him.

At Present, Japan’s Recent Engagements with Russia Reflect Energy Concerns More Than Diplomatic Reset

Japan’s engagement with Russia could just simply be driven by energy security concerns stemming from the U.S.-Iran conflict.

Before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, about 70% of Japan’s crude imports transited through the Strait of Hormuz, and the threat of prolonged disruption to this key shipping route has prompted Tokyo to explore alternative crude suppliers, among them Russia.

After all, Japan has continued importing about 9% of its liquefied natural gas from Russia since 2022 despite the latter’s invasion of Ukraine, even as its purchases of Russian crude oil have remained very limited.

As stated earlier, on May 4th, Japan received a shipment of crude oil from Russia’s Sakhalin-2 project, and per a report by Russia’s state-owned TASS news agency on May 27th, Japan appears to have taken delivery of another shipment of Russian oil.

According to the data from ship tracking services reviewed by a TASS correspondent, the tanker that delivered the shipment of Russian oil from Sakhalin to Japan is again headed to the Japanese port of Kiire, home to the oil depot of ENEOS, one of Japan’s largest oil companies.

Experts also suggest that Tokyo is seeking to resume visa-free visits to the Russian-controlled Southern Kuril Islands, claimed by Japan as its Northern Territories.

The trips were mainly intended for former Japanese residents displaced after the Soviet Union seized the islands at the end of World War Two. The visits had taken place annually but were halted in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and have since remained suspended amid tensions over Japan’s opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

According to James D.J. Brown, professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan Campus, Japan hopes to use a future meeting between Japanese and Russian foreign ministers, or their deputies, to persuade the Russian side to allow the visits on humanitarian grounds.

Apparently, the issue has gained urgency as the number of surviving former residents has dropped to fewer than 5,000, with their average age now exceeding 90.

However, Mr Brown is not very optimistic about the prospects for progress on this matter because of Russia repeatedly linking any concessions to Japan abandoning what it describes as ‘hostile policies’ (meaning sanctions), something that the Prime Minister Takaichi’s administration is unwilling to do.

So, what happens with the issue of visa-free visits to the Kuril Islands for former Japanese residents may provide deeper signals about where the relations between Japan and Russia are headed.

Tanmay Kadam is a geopolitical observer based in India. He has experience working as a Defense and International Affairs journalist for EurAsian Times. He can be contacted at tanmaykadam700@gmail.com.