Fresh signs of a deteriorating security landscape in Yemen are raising concerns that commercial shipping through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait could once again come under threat. Although the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthi movement largely stayed out of the latest Iran-related conflict, recent political, military and tribal developments inside Yemen suggest the risk of renewed attacks on maritime traffic in the Red Sea may be increasing.
The Red Sea has assumed even greater strategic importance this year after a conflict involving Iran severely disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, forcing energy exporters and commercial operators to rely more heavily on alternative routes leading to the Suez Canal.
Of course, this was only possible because the Houthis, who disrupted shipping in the Red Sea during the two-year Gaza war that started in October 2023, out of what they described as solidarity with the Palestinian, stayed largely out of the current bout of conflict between Iran and the U.S.-Israeli alliance.
However, this could change soon, going by the worrying signals emerging from the warring factions and tribal groups inside Yemen.
In recent weeks, Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement was seen adopting an increasingly forceful rhetoric against Israel and Saudi Arabia, which entailed warnings against Israeli attempts to establish a foothold along the Red Sea, followed by a ban on Israeli maritime navigation through the waterway, and reported threats of military escalation against Saudi Arabia if negotiations fail to produce further concessions.
On June 25th, the leader of Yemeni Houthi movement, Sayyid Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, said that the group is “closely monitoring the situation in Somalia and the Israeli enemy’s attempts to turn it into a foothold, with the aim of controlling the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and dominating the Red Sea….we affirm that we will not stand idly by in the face of any Israeli presence in Somalia. We will not wait for the hesitant and negligent regimes to act. Rather, we will take the initiative at any time the Israeli enemy establishes any presence there, targeting it with all available means.”
The warning was in reference to reports that Israel could be seeking a military presence in Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia overlooking the strategic Gulf of Aden near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The reports emerged amid Israel’s expanding ties with Somaliland, following the former’s recognition of Somaliland in late 2025 and the subsequent expansion of security ties, including Israeli training for Somaliland’s military and police forces. Somaliland’s defence minister, however, has denied that any negotiations are taking place over the establishment of an Israeli military base on its territory.
The remarks by the Houthi leader followed the Yemeni movement’s ban on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, enacted earlier this month.
The Author has not been able to find any direct statements from Houthi members, specifically signalling escalation against Saudi Arabia, however, reports suggest that despite the Houthis’ reluctance to jeopardise negotiations with Saudi Arabia, which could unlock salary payments and other economic measures for northern Yemen amid worsening food insecurity and shrinking humanitarian assistance, mounting public frustration over deteriorating living conditions could be testing that stance, as it poses a potential challenge to the group’s grip on power and underscores the need for urgent action.
Also, the Yemeni group has launched a mobilisation drive to expand its ranks, which reports suggest is aimed at pressuring the Saudis with the prospect of renewed hostilities, and if reports of public discontent in Northern Yemen are true, then it could also serve as a way of diverting people’s attention from worsening living conditions.
In addition to that, reports also highlight the remarks made by Tariq Saleh, a member of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, earlier this month, wherein he said that his forces are preparing for what he described as an inevitable and decisive battle against the Iran-aligned Houthi movement, signalling continued military escalation despite parallel political and security constraints on the ground.
Mr Saleh was speaking during a graduation ceremony for military media personnel affiliated with his National Resistance Forces on Yemen’s western coast on June 3rd, when he claimed that his forces possess capabilities and weaponry that would “surprise the enemy” in future confrontations.
On a separate occasion on the same day, Mr Saleh said that while political and international complexities have at times limited the resumption of full-scale fighting, his faction remains prepared to engage if conflict resumes, underscoring continued uncertainty over Yemen’s stalled peace trajectory and the durability of the current military balance.
Furthermore, in recent weeks, there have been reports of a tribal dispute in Yemen’s Al Jawf with rival tribal groups mobilising in support of both anti-Houthi and pro-Houthi factions amid rising tensions in the region. The dispute has drawn in multiple tribes, with competing narratives emerging over allegiance, influence and control in the northern governorate.
The immediate trigger is reported to have been the detention of a tribal figure, Sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham, by Houthi authorities following his intervention in a property dispute involving a Houthi-aligned arms dealer, Fares Mohammed Manaa, according to tribal accounts cited in local reports. The incident has since escalated into broader mobilisation, with calls for tribal solidarity and counter-mobilisation spreading across Al Jawf and surrounding areas.
Houthi-aligned messaging has framed the tribal mobilisation in Al Jawf as being influenced by Saudi Arabia, portraying it as an externally driven effort to provoke confrontation between local factions and fragment the Houthi-aligned tribal base, particularly in strategically important areas near the Saudi border.
The Houthi group has also emphasised reconciliation efforts, highlighting calls for the dispute to be resolved through customary tribal arbitration and warning that rejection of such mediation would indicate political motivations rather than genuine tribal grievances.
It has also urged tribal groups involved in the mobilisation to reject what it describes as foreign manipulation and instead direct any mobilisation toward Saudi Arabia, rather than internal rivalries among Yemeni factions.
Whether the dispute remains contained or escalates into broader clashes hinges on the ongoing mediation efforts and the extent to which both sides are willing to avoid direct confrontation.
Also, what has largely gone unnoticed and deserves more attention, according to the Author, is the Houthi chief’s reiteration of the group’s commitment to the Palestinian cause in his speech on June 25th, even before he addressed the issues about expanding ties between Israel and Somaliland, or even what he described as “the American-Saudi aggression, occupation, and blockade against Yemen”
“We affirm the steadfastness of our dear people, based on their faith-based identity and their Quranic path…in their adherence to the major issues of the nation, foremost among them: the Palestinian cause, with all that pertains to it in terms of people, land, and holy sites,” said al-Houthi while affirming the group’s stance on multiple issues as part of the conclusion of his speech.
Now, given that Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping in 2023–25 were largely justified by the group as solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and that it has largely stayed out of the current Iran-related hostilities, key signals of potential risk to maritime traffic may lie in developments around the US-brokered Israel–Hamas ceasefire, which remains nominally in force but is widely regarded as fragile, with repeated violations and little progress beyond the initial phase.
Unless, of course, the Yemeni group has been emboldened by Iran’s success at halting the traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and may consider replicating that success in its own backyard for its own interests, which is a strong possibility after June 17th signing of MoU between the U.S. and Iran that essentially restored elements of Iran’s regional leverage while reducing immediate military pressure, and was therefore seen as a big win for Tehran.
Risk Outlook for The Next 6-12 Months
Overall, even though Houthis have announced the ban on only what they identify as Israeli-affiliated shipping in the Red Sea, reports of deteriorating security landscape within Yemen, particularly in the context of larger rivalry between Houthis and Saudi Arabia, indicate that even Saudi interests in and along this waterway are at risk in the near term.
Iran’s success in reaching a framework agreement with the U.S. in mid-June on significantly favourable terms has increased the likelihood of Houthis trying to replicate such a scenario to strengthen their bargaining power in negotiations with Saudi Arabia.
It is important to watch out for updates relating to the implementation of the U.S.’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, of which the current fragile ceasefire between Iran and Hamas is only the first phase, as major signals of potential risk to maritime traffic may come from following the developments in this region, going by the past turn of events.
Most importantly, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping during the two-year Gaza war had targeted ships with no direct link with Israel, meaning shipping companies in general have a cause for concern about potential disruption to the traffic through the Red Sea.
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Tanmay Kadam is a geopolitical observer based in India. He has experience working as a Defence and International Affairs journalist for EurAsian Times. He can be contacted at tanmaykadam700@gmail.com.
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