Lebanon on Brink? Hezbollah Threatens Civil War Over US-Backed Plan to Disarm Non-State Armed Groups

A U.S.-brokered framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon has triggered sharp opposition from Hezbollah, with the Iran-backed armed group warning that any attempt to forcibly disarm non-state factions could plunge Lebanon into another civil war, underscoring the fragile path toward ending decades of conflict along the Israel-Lebanon border.

The agreement, announced in Washington on June 26^th, following U.S.-mediated negotiations, has been presented by American, Israeli, and Lebanese officials as an initial step toward a broader peace process rather than a final settlement.

“Today we’ve taken the first step in what will be a difficult journey, without a doubt, but an important and an essential and a necessary one,” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said before the agreement was inked.

At the agreement’s core is a commitment to strengthen Lebanese state authority and ultimately ensure that only official government security forces possess weapons, a longstanding objective supported by the United States and Israel.

Under the framework, Lebanon’s armed forces would gradually assume security responsibilities in designated areas of southern Lebanon through phased “pilot zones,” while Israeli troops would withdraw from those areas as implementation progresses.

“The trilateral framework we signed is a first step on the road to restoring Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, securing a permanent and final cessation of hostilities, enabling our people to go back to their land, and allowing all Lebanese to live in peace, security, and prosperity,” Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Nada Moawad, who signed the agreement on behalf of Lebanon, said.

The agreement also establishes a Military Coordination Group to oversee security arrangements and includes an initial U.S. humanitarian assistance package of US$ 100 million for Lebanon, in coordination with the United Nations (U.N.)

However, Hezbollah, which was not a party to the negotiations or a signatory to the agreement, rejected the proposal’s central premise of disarming non-state armed groups. Senior Hezbollah members warned that any attempt to confiscate the organization’s weapons by force would risk reigniting sectarian violence reminiscent of Lebanon’s devastating 1975-1990 civil war.

The group’s military capabilities have long been one of the most contentious issues in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah argues that its arsenal serves as a deterrent against Israeli military action and remains necessary until Israel fully withdraws from disputed territories and regional security concerns are resolved.

Its domestic opponents, meanwhile, contend that the existence of an armed organization outside state control undermines Lebanese sovereignty and repeatedly exposes the country to regional conflicts.

For Lebanon’s government, the agreement presents both an opportunity and a political dilemma. Officials have welcomed efforts to strengthen the authority of the Lebanese state and rebuild areas damaged by conflict, but implementing provisions related to Hezbollah’s weapons could prove politically explosive in a country whose power-sharing system depends on delicate sectarian balances.

That said, the framework agreement’s prospects of achieving its core objective of disarming Hezbollah remain uncertain because it is unfolding alongside broader diplomatic efforts to prevent a renewed regional conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.

This is because Iran views Lebanese Hezbollah as a central component of its regional power projection strategy and has been largely successful so far in tying the ongoing Israel-Hezbollah conflict to those wider negotiations.

Iranian officials have repeatedly argued that de-escalation in Lebanon is not separable from other theatres of confrontation, effectively linking the future of Hezbollah to Iran’s ongoing negotiations with the United States.

For instance, Lebanon was one of the theatres explicitly covered in the U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) that was signed on June 17^th and underpins the current 60-day ceasefire framework intended to produce a final comprehensive peace agreement covering Iran’s nuclear program, opening of the Strait of Hormuz, and sanctions relief.

Per the MoU’s text, both sides agreed that there would be an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.”

As a result, there were growing concerns in Israel and Lebanon that the Trump administration could be moving away from trying to weaken Hezbollah toward managing tensions with the Iran-backed militia in Lebanon.

Israeli concerns were reflected in comments from the country’s ambassador to the United States, Yechiel Leiter who said on the opening day of talks that “we are heading toward a train wreck,” which he later corrected continued on the day of signing framework agreement with Lebanon, saying, “with a lot of hard work … we put the train back on the tracks, and it’s running in the right direction.”

However, in the Author’s view, it would be premature for Tel Aviv and Beirut to dismiss such concerns, as U.S. President Donald Trump has exhibited far more desire to reach a negotiated settlement than the Iranian officials.

Also, the 60-day ceasefire agreed between the U.S. and Iran itself remains highly fragile in practice. While diplomacy continues under the agreed timeline, it continues to be challenged by renewed military incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, including an Iranian drone strike on a Singapore-flagged cargo vessel, Ever Lovely, on June 25th, and the retaliatory airstrikes by the U.S. on Iranian missile, drone storage, and coastal radar facilities on June 26^th.

Both sides have since traded accusations of breaching the ceasefire framework, sharply escalating tensions with continued disruptions to shipping through the waterway.

So, Lebanon must still be considered as part of a broader bargaining framework in a potential U.S.–Iran accommodation, which, depending on how it is reached, will determine whether the core objective of the U.S.–Israel–Lebanon framework agreement – the gradual disarmament of non-state armed groups and the transfer of security control to the Lebanese Armed Forces – can/will be implemented to its fullest extent.

Unless, of course, Israel is able to defeat Hezbollah completely before any potential U.S.–Iran accommodation is reached, and that is assuming that Iran does not suspend its negotiations with the United States to prevent this from happening, basically in a bid to force Washington into reining in Israel.

At least that is what Tel Aviv is hoping for. “In this performance-based trilateral framework agreement, Iran is out, Hizbollah is out, and the road to peace between Israel and Lebanon is in,” said the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Yechiel Leiter, who signed the agreement on behalf of Israel.

Nevertheless, the framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon is still significant because it is the first formal diplomatic opening between the two countries in decades, which in the future could prove to be a first step toward eliminating at least one of the Middle East’s persistent sources of instability.

Tanmay Kadam is a geopolitical observer based in India. He has experience working as a Defence and International Affairs journalist for EurAsian Times. He can be contacted at tanmaykadam700@gmail.com.